



GLOBAL
ZERO

A WORLD WITHOUT
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Global Zero Summit
The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Remarks by Sec. George P. Shultz
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Sec. George Shultz: Okay, so here we are at the Reagan library. I'm wearing a tie that Ronald Reagan gave me early in the primaries. It says on it, "Democracy is not a spectator sport, so get in the arena." He was in the arena. You're in the arena. So it's the 25th anniversary of Reykjavik, so come on, let's hear it for Ronald Reagan. Yay! *[Applause]*

Now, what I plan to do is this. First of all, I'll reminisce a little bit about the Reykjavik summit, what came before it, what came after it, because I think there are some lessons there. Then I want to trace what has happened in the last five years since the subject got back up on the table, I think to a large extent following the op-ed that was mentioned in the introduction. And then I want to say some things about what do we do now? Where do we go from here?

So first of all, about Reykjavik. We were scheduled to have a summit meeting in Washington, and sort of out of the blue came a proposal by the Soviets to have a little preparatory meeting. They suggested it be either London or Reykjavik. We thought, well, London it'll be a circus; Reykjavik is isolated, we'll take Reykjavik. So we didn't know what agenda they had in mind. We knew our positions well. And we brought to Reykjavik a very strong team so that we could field, in a sense, whatever might come up.

Recently we found in the Hoover archives, which contains astonishing things, we found the instructions that the Politburo gave to Gorbachev as he went to the Reykjavik Summit. Do I wish I had had that document beforehand. But it was clear that he was to make these dramatic proposals. But it was all for the purpose of killing the strategic defense initiative. The strategic defense initiative was pooh-poohed by all the experts in the United States, they didn't think much of it for some reason, but the Soviets thought a of it and their object was to get rid of it.

So we meet, and it was very dramatic. There was a room upstairs in Hofdi house where there was a US room, and then a Soviet room, and then a big common room, people could mingle. And one of the interesting things that started there was a relationship between Paul Nitze on our side, and

Marshal Akhromeyev on their side. One of the things Paul found out that Akhromeyev was a student of James Fenimore Cooper, he read *The Last of the Mohicans* and so on. So Akhromeyev turns out to be a very appealing figure.

At any rate, these dramatic proposals were put on the table, they were discussed. We had two all-nighters between the first and second day, one on arms control – our side was chaired by Paul Nitze – and the only Soviet experts sat around and we speculated about who would be on the Soviet side. Paul said, “Well, how about Marshal Akhromeyev?” And all the experts said, “He won’t even be there. They don’t come to things like this.” Well, as it turned out, he was not only there, he was in charge, absolutely, totally, 100 percent in charge.

So Paul wakes me up about 2:00 in the morning and they had come to an impasse over the bomber counting rule. And Paul and I talked it over and we said, “Well, we don’t see any reason to change our position; it’s a sensible position.” And then Paul apologized for waking me up. I said, “Well, who do you think Akhromeyev woke up?” So he came back and the Soviets went along with our position.

At any rate, by the time the night was over, basically what became the INF treaty and the START treaty were given a lot more substance. But maybe of even more importance, people don’t follow this. Roz Ridgway, Rick’s successor, his assistant secretary, negotiated an agreement for the first time that the Soviets would agree that human rights would be a regular, recognized subject on our agenda. It was by way of seeing the start in an open way of a change in the Soviet system.

So all of this happened at Reykjavik, and we did, of course, wind up talking about a world free of nuclear weapons. This was not a new idea. Ronald Reagan had championed it. He’d given speeches during the presidential campaign. It always bothered me a little that he made these speeches and he got elected, and as he tried to move his agenda into the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy resisted and he couldn’t get anywhere. I had a feeling that maybe Gorbachev had the same problem.

So they sit down at Reykjavik and the bureaucracy’s not there. So the leaders can agree on what they both believed. It’s a lesson. I know all the bureaucracy felt, never let your leaders meet again without their minders being present. Or always give them a pre-negotiated communiqué with a few brackets and that’s all they can discuss. But Reykjavik was a meeting of leaders and it was of course fascinating. Disappointing that we weren’t able to consolidate what had been reached, but once these things are on the table, they’re there.

Now, after Reykjavik it was striking, and I remember going back to Washington, and I was virtually summoned to the British ambassador’s

residence, and Margaret Thatcher hand-bagged me. You know, she used to carry a little stiff handbag. She hand-bagged me and she said, “George, how can you sit there and allow the president to agree to a world free of nuclear weapons?” I said, “Margaret, he’s the president.” “Yes, but you’re supposed to be the one with his feet on the ground.” “But Margaret, I agreed with him.” “Grrrr.” Her reaction was very widely shared, that this was a nutty idea.

Now it was very striking when, in the Cold War, the issue kind of went to sleep. And on the 20th anniversary of Reykjavik, five years ago, we held a meeting at Hoover in Stanford, and we had Sam Nunn somewhat involved, Bill Perry was there, some other very good people. I got Henry Kissinger interested. And out of it came the op-ed that was mentioned, and the four of us signed it, and a lot of other people joined, calling for a world free of nuclear weapons.

And the contrast and reaction was stunning. It was, first of all, global. People from all over the world read this and got in touch. People in the United States were really deeply affected by it. There were many who thought it was a terrible idea, but it was interesting that even though many thought it was a terrible idea, the steps that were recommended as the things you should do to get to a world free of nuclear weapons were thought to be a good idea.

So at any rate, the subject started to gain some traction. Among the notable things that happened was the establishment of this organization, and it has had a major impact. But let me tell you first of all some of the things that have happened. I do it partly to remind you, partly to bump people up when you sometimes feel, you know, “How are we ever going to get anywhere?” It’s worthwhile to just catalogue how much has happened, because it shows how much can happen. So I wrote down a few items.

First of all, during our last presidential campaign, then Senator Obama endorsed the view with specific reference to our op-ed, and Senator McCain made a very powerful speech in which he said, “Ronald Reagan had a dream of a world free of nuclear weapons, and I share that dream.” So it was not a partisan issue in the campaign, but endorsed by both candidates.

After the election, President Obama made a speech in Prague, a very powerful speech, and Senator McCain made a powerful speech in the United States Senate reiterating his view. I consider that to be very important because it kept it non-partisan. Very important point, Rick was making that point earlier. Then you had the statement of President Obama and President Medvedev saying that they joined in seeking a world free of nuclear weapons.

You had a resolution in the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted. And it was interesting, I was present, that the leaders around the table – for instance Hu Jintao from China didn't just say yes, they made statements, and you read the statements, there's a lot of substance in the statement; it wasn't just a gesture. So I thought that was very important.

The striking note was by President Sarkozy who said, "Yes, we're all in favor of this, but let's get real. If a country like North Korea can get a nuclear weapon, where are we? Iran gets a nuclear weapon, where are we? We have to face the reality that there's some difficult problems that have to be confronted." But at any rate, a unanimously adopted Security Council resolution.

Then there was a very significant meeting in Washington. 40 nations came to talk about one of the steps – namely, how do you get better control of fissile material. As everybody here knows, the hardest part of making a bomb is to get the fissile material. It's not a piece of cake once you have that, but it's doable. So that was an important meeting and there is a follow on to it, so I think it really has accomplished something.

Then you have the new START treaty, which is modest in what it did, but it was very important because it preserved the verification system that was put into place and which we fought so hard for, "trust but verify," onsite inspection and so on. And I might say that that was ratified with – we got all of the Republican former secretaries of state to come out clearly in writing in support of it, and I think it made quite a difference.

Then you had the government of Norway, which is a very good convener. They came and they said, "If you bring your act to Oslo we'd like to have a meeting." They got 29 countries there, all the countries that have nuclear weapons. There were some very good discussions. There was a meeting in Rome that President Gorbachev and I co-chaired, sponsored by the Italian government. It was just before a G8 meeting, and the G8 communiqué that came out of the meeting was a very important communiqué. Among other things it talked about the importance of having genuine follow up in terms of enforcement. If we're going to get somewhere here, we've got to have a way of assuring people that people who might violate the rules are looked after severely.

I might say that the number of nuclear weapons around today is I think around a third of it what it was outside of the Cold War. So once again to say that you can't get anywhere flies in the face of the evidence; there has been a great deal accomplished.

Then we have the Australia/Japan effort. A very conscious, well-done effort. They worked at it for quite awhile and produced a statement with ideas for what to do and kind of was a rallying point for Asian countries.

You had various groups for four, so to speak, throughout Europe signing statements. You have the Catholic bishops – I don't know if you've read their statement – it's a very powerful statement with a moral tone to it, as you might expect.

We've had enquiries from the evangelical community that came to Hoover, a group of some 35 of them. This was quite awhile ago. And we gave them some reading ahead of time, and to our surprise, they had read it. So we had an informed meeting. And one of the things that came out of it that's pretty interesting, I thought, was they wrote two letters. They gave one to Sam Nunn and one to me. The one to me was to John McCain; the one to Nunn was to Barack Obama. The letters said the same thing. It said, "Some of it's for you, some of it's for the other guy, but if you'll get behind this effort to get rid of nuclear weapons, you'll have our support." So that got delivered. So that's a big powerful constituency in the US.

Then we have the retired Bishop of California, Episcopal Bishop of California. Bill Swing is a very able, wonderful man. And he started something called the United Religions Initiative. All religions come, all over the world, there are millions of people involved in this, and they have adopted this subject as among the things that they're discussing and promoting.

So there is a lot that's happened. And I think the meetings that you've had, and you were telling me last night that you have groups on campuses all over the country, student groups, all over the world. I find at Stanford if you show one of the films, *Tipping Point*, we can't afford the one that you guys put up, but ours is free – but you show any of these things and you get an immediate response from the students, and it's a very good thing to do.

So a lot has been accomplished. On the other hand, we aren't there; we know that. We're a long ways from home. So what do we do now? Well, I think first of all it's important to continue keeping the subject on the front burner in any way possible, and not let it sort of die as it has done in the past. Meetings like this are an example. The meetings I've mentioned are examples. But it's also important to keep at it in other ways that are, in a sense, substantive. Let me give some examples of substantive things.

We had a conference on steps, that is, what can you do about the nuclear fuel cycle? How is it possible to get control of fissile material and so on? And examining these carefully and publishing. When you do that, you put some ideas out there that have more than just "what can we do about it?" – and you also identify people who know something about the subject. And then if people in the government pick that up and they want to do something, they have people that they can go to that have in effect said, "We know about this subject, we're interested in it, and if you want to hear from us or want some help, why, you can get it."

I think the films are a very important part of this. We've also said to ourselves, "What's the other side of the coin of the weapons?" The other side of the coin is the doctrine that presumably governs their use. It's the doctrine of deterrence. Mutual assured destruction. So we have tried to examine that concept. One thing you get out of it is nuclear has stolen the concept of deterrence. Deterrence is an old concept, and it's a good concept, it's comfortable. You position yourself in such a way that you say to anybody who might want to do you damage that that's not going to pay off. So you avoid a lot of wear and tear that way. But there are lots of ways of constructing deterrence that aren't nuclear, and nuclear has come along so powerfully in connection with deterrence, that we've tended to neglect other things that are more useful and more usable.

But you also say to yourself, a deterrence is the nuclear weapon, really. It didn't deter the Soviets from turning the North Koreans loose on the South, or us from responding, so we had the Korean War. It didn't deter the Korean War. It didn't deter the Soviets from crushing the Hungarian uprising, or Prague Spring. It didn't deter them from creating the conditions that led to the Berlin Airlift, or us from responding. It didn't deter them from going into Afghanistan. So you ask yourself, what did it deter? Well, it deterred a nuclear exchange, but I can think of an easier way to deter that.

So it just shows you that the deterrent effect of a nuclear weapon is very limited. And you ask yourself, what are the problems that we have today? What are our security threats? A great many of them involve terrorist-type attacks. What good is the nuclear weapon as a deterrent to that? It's practically irrelevant. What good is it as a deterrent to cyber attacks? Practically irrelevant. So I think if you examine the doctrine that governs the use of nuclear weapons, you begin to get the sense that it really isn't very useful. So we have published things on that.

We recently had a conference on what we call the Nuclear Enterprise – weapons, power plants nuclear fuel cycle, the immense impact of something going wrong with one, as in the Fukushima plant in Japan. And you become aware – and I'm told this is in your film – of the number of what the weapons people call broken arrows, that is accidents that happen but for various reasons did not set off a nuclear explosion fortunately. But we know that any system managed by human beings, there can be a mistake, as when six nuclear armed cruise missiles were loaded on to an Air Force plane a couple of years ago and flown across the country and for 36 hours, nobody knew anything about it. So you have to watch out for these things.

Then another thing that has been done, that a retired general, I think, from Pakistan here, and I'm glad to hear probably there's somebody from India here, I hope so – but at any rate, there is a group of retired former foreign

minister generals from India and Pakistan who came to Hoover. They asked to come and we were glad to have them. They spent three days, trying to see if they couldn't find some competence building measures in their nuclear arena that would make it a little safer. And they did develop what I thought was a very impressive statement, and they all signed it and they gave it to their respective governments. What good it will do, I don't know, but certainly that's an area that needs a lot of help.

So these are things to do. But another thing that's been done is the Fuel Bank. That's got quite a lot of legs now. It's got money. It's being developed. But we have some problems that are there, as Sarkozy said, there's North Korea. We're not doing anything effective about North Korea. There's Iran. Iran is obviously seeking a nuclear weapon, and they're pretty far along. So far as they can see, nothing constructive is done about it. But the result is, every country in the Middle East, no matter how much oil and gas they have, they need nuclear power plants, hurray. Power plants, you've got to be kidding. So the proliferation potential is very strong as a result. So we have to do something about that.

I mentioned India/Pakistan. That's a very delicate situation. As I said, we spent three days immersing ourselves in it, Bill Perry and I, and you just have to keep your fingers crossed that it can remain stable. A nuclear exchange there would be a human catastrophe and it would also have a big impact globally. So we have to face up to these issues. I have my own thoughts about how to do it. But certainly if we have a North Korea that becomes a real nuclear power, if we have Iran that becomes a nuclear power, and then Middle East, other countries, it's out of control. So somehow we have to get this back in the box. Part of it is continuing strong efforts by the countries that have nuclear weapons to reduce their size. I think that's very important, but at the same time we have to face up to these other things.

Well, just to bring it to a conclusion. In my own thinking more and more as I've been messing with this issue a long time, during World War 2, I'm still a Marine, but I was on active duty as a Marine for almost three years in the Pacific. I'm on a troop ship coming home, and we all knew we'd be formed into the Marine groups that would assault the Japanese homeland. Every Marine on the ship had done at least one landing, maybe two, so we knew these are not picnics. We're hardly out of port when we hear something called an atomic bomb had been dropped. Nobody had a clue what it was, but since it got announced, maybe it was something. Ship lumbers on. Then we hear another one was dropped. We hit port in San Diego – the war was over. So whatever it was, we figured it saved our lives.

Then I saw the pictures of Hiroshima. I'll never forget it. What kind of a weapon is this that can produce that kind of destruction? And then in various capacities I became involved, of course especially with President

Reagan as Secretary of State. And I remember -- and this has now, they have declassified the National Security Council records -- early in his presidency he asked the joint chiefs to tell him what would be the casualties in the United States of a full scale Soviet attack? And they deliberated and came back and they told him their estimate was on the order of 150 million initial casualties, with a lot of follow on casualties because infrastructure is basically gone. In other words, it wipes us out. He was asked if he would retaliate, he said, "Yes, and it would wipe them out too." And so how many times have you heard them say, "What's so good about keeping the peace through an ability to wipe each other out?"

There was a strong moral undercutting to Ronald Reagan's point of view. The speech that is generally known as the "Evil Empire" speech, if you read that whole speech, it's a very moral kind of a speech. And in the speech is a reference to his view that we should get rid of nuclear weapons as immoral. So the more I thought about it, the more I talk to the evangelicals, read the Catholic bishops statement, get involved with Bill Swing and his group, the more I come to a kind of a moral view. What right does some human being have to press a button and kill hundreds of thousands if not millions of human beings? You're not God.

So I say, here we are in the Reagan Library; I'm a Reagan guy. And remember about ten years before he died, he learned that he had Alzheimer's disease. And he wrote out in his own handwriting a beautiful letter to his beloved American people. And the last two sentences of that letter went: "I now start the journey into the sunset of my life, but I know that for America, there will always be a bright dawn ahead." He might very well have said, and particularly as I know somehow we will be part of an effort to get rid of nuclear weapons. That was very deep in him.

So I say, let's jack up our resolve, use our best brains and creativity, and get rid of nuclear weapons, so that we can, in a sense, win one more for the Gipper. Thank you.

Amb. Richard Burt: Thank you for that really quite comprehensive but also very personal statement, and it's difficult to really open up a Q&A session following a heartfelt set of remarks like that, but I want to return to the point that you underscored, I think several points, and that was Ronald Reagan exercised leadership on this issue, and other Republican presidents have done so as well. It was President Nixon with Henry Kissinger as his Secretary of State that negotiated in 1972 the first limitations on offensive nuclear forces, as well as the ABM treaty. You mentioned the INF treaty in 1987. The START treaty was finally completed under President Bush 41.

So it was a little bit alarming late last year when the Obama administration's new START treaty, which I think you correctly described as a modest treaty, ran into such opposition from the Republicans in the Senate. Are you worried about the fact that the Republicans seem to be

moving into a kind of anti-arms control and are losing their support for the Ronald Reagan goal of eliminating nuclear weapons? And if so, what can we do about that?

Sec. George Shultz: Well, I can tell you what I did about it. I wrote an op-ed on the verification provisions in the new START treaty. And then we worked together, and all of the former secretaries of state, Republicans, wrote a public statement supporting the START treaty. And I'm told by people involved that it made an important point. And I keep saying to people, you know, all of us that signed that treaty have negotiated these things, we know something about it, and we thought about it.

And to the presidential candidate I might say, all of a sudden you're president and you have this black box and you have the capacity to give an order, and you hope somebody else, somewhere else doesn't give the order before you do that can kill. Who do you think you are? I think it's very sobering when you suddenly are in that position. It was certainly very sobering for Ronald Reagan. So he said, "I don't want to have limits, I want to have reductions," you remember. When his proposals were first announced to eliminate all the INF intermediate range weapons, the Soviets had something like 1500 of them deployed, we had none deployed, and it cut strategic arms in half. People said, the man isn't serious about arms control to make such ridiculous proposals. However, they came to pass. So it shows the kind of leadership and drive.

And I think as far as Republicans are concerned, we have to be careful. I think it's important to be in strong defense. But I want people to think of just what the nuclear weapons actually do deter, and what threat it is that they think nuclear weapons in our arsenal now is deterring. I don't see much usefulness myself. So I have to have some quiet discussions.

Amb. Richard Burt: I'm going to open this up to the floor, and if you want to be recognized, I will recognize you. If you have a question or a brief comment, please identify yourself, and if relevant, your affiliation.

ACM (Ret.) Shashi Tyagi:

Secretary Shultz, my name is Air Chief Marshal Tyagi, I'm from India. You have stated that the entire doctrine of deterrence with nuclear weapons is a questionable one, and you give several examples of Korea and Afghanistan and various other ones. And indeed, if they only deter somebody else from using nuclear weapons, is it worthwhile to think – to delegitimize these weapons? It will be a while before we get rid of all of them, but if you've got to delegitimize by saying that we all work towards a "no first use," that means we are still deterring others from using it, but you have announced an intention of not using it at all. In which case, we are just deterring the use of nuclear weapons and not really using them as

weapons of war, which you have rightly stated are not really weapons of war.

Sec. George Shultz: I'm not clear exactly, but it's a "no first use" kind of argument.

Amb. Richard Burt: He's saying if it's going to take some time to eliminate all nuclear weapons, wouldn't it make sense though for countries to adopt "no first use" strategies, so they're only going to be prepared to use nuclear weapons in the event that they're attacked.

Sec. George Shultz: Well, I think a "no first use" policy is okay, but I don't put a heavy stock in it, because you can change your mind like that. So I look more at what you are capable of doing. But "no first use" – but then subsequent things like being sure that the warheads and the delivery vehicles are not connected to each other. That provides a certain margin of safety, or located so it takes awhile to use them, and some sort of verification or transparency and things of that kind I think are very important.

There's a wonderful article – I'm a trustee of the Reagan Library so I'm selling – but you can go into the store here, it's a terrific store, and among the things that I like and I pass them out are a little thing about this big, and it's a magnifying glass, and it goes in a leather case, and on the case it says, "Trust but verify." So I think "no first use" statements of intentions are good, but more important is what you're capable of, because you can change your mind so fast. But in the meantime, if you're willing to say "no first use," maybe you're willing to have onsite inspection so people can have a greater sense of assurance of what is actually taking place.

Amb. Richard Burt: Professor?

Prof. Ciu Liru: Thank you very much, Secretary Shultz, and just like before when I have listened to your speech, I can learn a lot.

Amb. Richard Burt: Can you speak a little closer to the microphone?

Prof. Ciu Liru: Okay, thank you again. I'm following my Indian colleague _____ a response to the question. I think in recent years we have achieved a lot, just as you pointed out. Global Zero and some other arms control and nuclear arms control disarmament campaigns. But to some extent I think the public attention to these campaigns is not very high. And it's not very high because, good thing, that is most people believe nuclear war is much less likely than in the Cold War period. So that's why in the Cold War period the tension to avoid the nuclear war threat is very high.

Then people's attention more or less concentrated on the problem or threat of proliferation, just as you pointed out, on the North Korean nuclear program, Iran possibly a nuclear program, and some others. But maybe we

have ignored some of the other side of the problem, and why there is a growing tenure of the proliferation.

For some countries, some forces would like to make efforts to obtain the nuclear weapons. That is because it is still regarded, it is very much important in practical things. It is important then, one of the reasons is, it is important in the military doctrine, the nuclear weapons role is still very important. Of course, as a deterrence, to avoid the nuclear exchange between the major powers has been reduced. But still in the doctrine it is important of the deterrence, and the “no first use” is very much relevant to this doctrine.

And I think most major powers do not agree to declare the policy of “no first use” because it is too important that the military doctrine for the deterrents. Because deterrents is not only to deter the other nuclear power to have nuclear war, but also to deter for some other purpose, including the non-nuclear powers and the conventional wars. So this is a very much important element, and for the practical possible use of nuclear weapons.

So my question is, we should pay very high attention to the reduction of the quantities of the nuclear weapons, of the nuclear stockpiles. But also it’s important to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in the practical terms and in the military doctrines. I think we have not done enough in these areas. This is my question and I want to see your response.

Sec. George Shultz: Well, as I said, I’m not against a “no first use” but I’m just cautioning that it’s a statement that a country can change their mind instantly. So you need to look at their capabilities, as I said earlier. Many countries I think in the most recent US nuclear posture review say no nuclear use against a non-nuclear power, so that goes par to what you were saying. But what I think is it’s important to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and to take all of these steps that we’ve talked about, like de-mating and de-alerting and so on, so that you put them in a posture that’s less ready to use as much as you possibly can, and get them out of the military doctrine.

I remember an Indian general I think at the Oslo meeting I mentioned was saying we should take nuclear weapons out of all military planning. And then he had a subtle point, that for that part of the planning, they cost money, and pretty soon the military will want to use the money for something else and so on. But all kinds of things like that I think are steps in the right direction toward reducing the numbers and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons.

Amb. Richard Burt: Ambassador Fahmy.

Amb. Nabil Fahmy: Secretary Shultz, if I can take you back to another issue you raised, the whole issue of leadership partitions vis-à-vis the role of the bureaucracy. In the case of the US and the case of the Soviet Union, how far ahead was

President Reagan, ahead of his own bureaucracy in terms of pursuing nuclear zero, and how far ahead was President Gorbachev? You mentioned, for example, the Soviets came to Reykjavik with proposals because of their concern on SDI, but I'd like you to address this point, if possible, also from the perspective of given that a lot of the _____, as you said, were not there yet, what can be done in the future to _____?

Sec. George Shultz: I think it's a very important point, and it's the reason why in my description of Reykjavik I made the point that I did, namely that all of a sudden there was President Reagan dealing with an opposite number, and he didn't have a pre-negotiated communiqué limiting him to brackets and so forth, so the leaders actually decided what they decided.

It is a fact that bureaucracies develop a stake in the thing that they're doing. It's sort of a law of how things work. So I think you have to build in ways to challenge them. And probably the biggest challenge comes from leadership at the time. The shift of gears in the Reagan administration towards drastic reductions was the product of Ronald Reagan very personally. It was his view, and he insisted he didn't get as far as he wanted, but he got a considerable distance. And he was resisted.

So I think the role of leadership is essential and it's got to be strong enough to push through often a lot of bureaucratic resistance. Although you usually find in the bureaucracy some thoughtful people who may come around to your point of view, so don't give up on bureaucracies, but I think it's hard to turn the ship around sometimes.

That's why bureaucracies don't like Summit meetings, and they have pre-negotiated communiqués. This is a little history on President Reagan. He had been to two of the G7 Summits and in both of them, there was a communiqué, and he said the leaders spent their time talking about the pre-negotiated, their sherpa, so-called, negotiated communiqués. They talked about the brackets that had been left, and that was the topic. And he thought that was a crummy way to go about things.

When I switched from being his economic advisor to this Secretary of State, suddenly we were to be the hosts of the G7 meeting, which was to take place in Williamsburg. And he decided that there would be no pre-negotiated communiqué. He refused to have it. Drove everybody up the wall. So we go to Williamsburg and he said, "Well, it's supposed to be a meeting of leaders, so you don't know what they are going to agree on until they get together and agree on it, so how can you have a pre-negotiated communiqué?" And so that's what happened. And we got the two best communiqués that came out of any G7 Summit as a result. But it reflected what the leaders talked about, and they kind of liked it.

Then we had the first meeting between President Reagan and President Gorbachev, which was in Genève, and I remember President Reagan

decided on the same thing. And I told that to Ambassador Dobrynin and he could not believe it. He said, “We always negotiate these things ahead of time.” I said, “You can’t take a chance, you don’t know.” I had met Gorbachev a couple of times by that time, and I said, “I’ve gotten to know your leader a little bit, try it out on him, I think he might like it.” Anyway, that’s the way it was at Genève, and by the same token, it was a strain – Roz Ridgway on our side and Bessmertnykh on their side – finally produced a very fine joint statement. But it reflected what the leaders talked about.

And so Reykjavik was kind of in that spirit, but it was part of the spirit of saying leaders are going to come together and they’re going to talk and we want to have a communiqué that reflects whatever it was they said. Even at Williamsburg we had the craftsmen there build a table. Since the State Department paid for it, I claimed it after Williamsburg and it’s now in the State Department. But the table had a place for each participant leader, with a mike and an earphone. Interpreters and note-takers were in another room. So physically in the room were only the leaders. So that provides an illusion that you’re by yourself, even though you know that people are listening in and so on. So he maximized the amount of time they spent in there with no staff around. The staff, the secretaries of the Treasury negotiated in a separate place and stayed in a separate place, and we interacted, but the idea was, if it’s a meeting of leaders, let’s make it a meeting of leaders.

And it comes back to the basic point of your question. The bureaucrats can give you a tremendous help. I know as Secretary of Labor, Budget, Treasury, State, in all those cases I found the permanent people were immensely helpful. But at the same time, leadership got an obligation to set the pace.

Amb. Richard Burt: A Russian question.

Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Pavel Zolotarev:

Excuse me, but my question will be in the Russian language.

Amb. Richard Burt: Can you speak up a little closer to the mike please?

Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Pavel Zolotarev:

Excuse me, please. My question will be in the Russian language.

(Translator): Mr. Shultz, what do you think, what is necessary to accomplish in order to achieve the situation when the missile defense creation doesn’t contradict the global zero objectives? Specifically when we shift to a multilateral regime of nuclear arms reduction? Thank you.

Sec. George Shultz: I think that strategic defense is an essential element to finally getting to zero, because it is an insurance policy for everybody. That if some cheater somehow gets a weapon and a ballistic missile, you at least have a defense. So I don't think it's in opposition, I think it's in support of getting to zero.

Now, at Reykjavik that was the final bone of contention, as it was obvious that the Soviet object was to kill President Reagan's effort to learn how we could defend ourselves. And we did have a proposal that we talked about that we both agree not to deploy anything for seven years, during which time all these massive productions were to take place. And I remember towards the end President Gorbachev said to President Reagan, "Mr. President, if we don't have any nuclear-armed ballistic missiles left, then why do you need a defense against them?" And President Reagan said, "Because people know how to make them. There will always be some rogue country involved, and you'll be glad to have it just as we will, and we'll share our technology with you." And Gorbachev said, "Mr. President, you won't even share milk technology with us." So it was an unproductive exchange. But I think that the question could just as easily be put, if there are no ballistic missiles, why are you worried about a defense against them?

I know missile defense is a very contentious issue, and it's a contentious issue today. On the other hand, if you're an Israeli and you have a lot of missiles pointed at you, and Hamas missiles at you – I don't know the extent to which they have missile defenses, but I know they have a lot – you're glad to be able to defend yourself. And of course a ballistic missile is something else again. But I don't think it's the enemy of the effort. I think in the end there have to be some assurances that somebody who cheats can be dealt with, and will be dealt with.

Amb. Richard Burt: Larry Korb.

Dr. Lawrence Korb: Mr. Secretary, how do you think ratifying the comprehensive Test Ban treaty and the Fissile Material Control Treaty would move us in the direction of Global Zero?

Sec. George Shultz: I think ratifying the comprehensive Test Ban treaty would be a very good important step and I'd like to see it happen. I would not like to see it put up for ratification until we know we have the votes. The worst thing that could happen would be for it to fail. And I've said before, I think a senator who voted against it the first time could now justify not changing his mind but changing his vote, because the circumstances have changed. That is, at the time we talked about how it was possible to build out a detection system. Well, one has been built out now, and it has been demonstrated, so that works. And we have not had any tests since the first President Bush stopped them, and we have an elaborate stockpile stewardship program in the labs that is now very well financed, and I think they have demonstrated

pretty well that they can certify the safety and security and the reliability of the weapons, which presumably that's what you'd get out of testing.

Actually I think the stockpile stewardship program is better than testing for that purpose. Testing only shows you that you tested something and it went off or it didn't go off. But the careful analysis that's going into it now has led, as I understand it from the nuclear scientists, has led to a much better understanding.

We went -- Bill Perry and Sam Nunn and Henry Kissinger and I with a scientist, Sid Drell, who works with us -- went over to Livermore lab. We spent a whole morning and the head of Sandia came and the head of Los Alamos came, and we spent all the time trying to understand exactly what the stockpile stewardship program is, what it entails, what the science is and so what do they do? And it was a very reassuring meeting.

So I hope it can get ratified, but there's a lot of opposition, and the process of getting something ratified by the Senate is a strange process. I remember when we got the INF Treaty signed, what we got was actually what the Senate had endorsed. So we brought back exactly the treaty that they had voted for. However, they're very careful people, so we brought back the entire negotiating record of the INF thing, put it in a secure room in the Senate. The final negotiator, a foreign service officer named Mike Liptman, was terrific. He was there all day long. Any senator could come and ask questions, any certified staff member could come and ask questions. We had a lot of public testimony, we had private testimony. So we really worked it very, very hard before we even put the treaty up for ratification. And in the end it was ratified, I forget, 93 to 2 or something like that.

But you have to go about it with great care. And at least as I see it, the first time around the administration negotiated they sort of threw it at the Senate, and it got bounced back. This time it should be done with great care.

Amb. Richard Burt: So the last question back here.

Jonathan Landay: Jonathan Landay with McClatchy Newspapers. I wanted to build on Ambassador Burt's question about the politics, and Larry's question about CTBT, because right now the focus of the presidential election and the debates are the economy and jobs. The Obama administration, however, is now, has begun its campaign to get ratification of the CTBT, and for whatever reason, it looks like this vote will take place in the middle of a presidential election campaign. There's no way to avoid, if that happens, the politics of this, and indubitably you're going to get charges from opponents about how the president wants to weaken the United States etcetera etcetera. What are you and other proponents of Global Zero

prepared to do to try and de-politicize this issue in the middle of a presidential election campaign?

Sec. George Shultz: Well, I've already said what my point of view is – that it needs to be worked on carefully. That point has been made. And as I understand it, the people in charge of this who are in the State Department are carefully going around right now and briefing senators one by one, trying to answer all their questions, every factual thing laid out. There are certain ambiguities that need to be cleared up that I assume the State Department is clearing up. So all that needs to be done.

But I would say what I said before, that if you get into next Spring or so, in the heat of a presidential campaign, and all of a sudden it looks political, I would back off. Because I think that the only way for something like this to go forward is if it has support on both sides of the aisle and can somehow be turned into a non-partisan sort of an issue. That means before you go forward you have some very powerful sponsors on all sides.

Whether it's possible to do that – I've been out of office now for over two decades, but the Washington I read about is not the Washington that I knew – whether it can be turned around or not, I don't know. I know a lot of the people individually. I say, gee, these are the same reasonable people I used to deal with, but it doesn't look very good.

But the big thing is, count your votes. And we don't want to have a defeat on this. It's important, I'd like to see it ratified, I've said so publicly. I've given my rationale publicly, and willing to work at it as we did with the START treaty. There are other things languishing like the Law of the Sea treaty and so on. There are a lot of things there that should get ratified.

So how you get something that makes sense, and get it forward – so on the one hand the administration that gets it ratified doesn't say, "Look at me, what I did, against all those stumblebums." If that's the way you go about it, you're not going to get it ratified. And at the same time, anything that one side proposes the other side objects to, that's not going to get you anywhere either. So there has to be a deep breath and some sensible people step forward.

Amb. Richard Burt: Mr. Secretary, I just want, I know, on behalf of everyone here, to express our appreciation for your taking the time and trouble to join us today. I don't think I'm betraying your confidence in saying that in one of our conversations when I called you to invite you to come, I think not to this meeting but to the earlier meeting when you spoke to us in Europe, you told me that as you begin to think about the things you wanted to accomplish over the rest of your life, that this issue, the goal of nuclear elimination, is really your top priority. And I think that I can speak for

everyone here to say I don't think this issue could have a better advocate than George Shultz. So many, many things.

Sec. George Shultz: Thank you. Thank you for what you're doing.

[Applause.]

[End of Audio]