Nuclear Crisis Group: NATO-Russia Crisis Brief
The Nuclear Crisis Group asked six eminent experts and former officials from the United States, Russia and Europe to provide insights on the current state of affairs between the US/NATO and Russia, and pragmatic near-term options to improve stability and reduce the risks of conflict and escalation in Europe.
Blundering Toward Nuclear Chaos: The Trump Administration After 3 years
The American Nuclear Policy Initiative (ANPI), a task force of former government and non-governmental experts, released an objective analysis of U.S. nuclear policy under Donald Trump.
Loose Cannons: The President and US Nuclear Posture
“The US president’s unfettered authority to order the use of nuclear weapons and an unstable US nuclear posture create a compound existential risk.”
Nuclear Crisis Group: South Asia Post-Crisis Brief
“[T]he Nuclear Crisis Group asked six respected analysts from the region and the United States to assess what they saw, what they think happened, and what lessons they take away from the Balakot incident [of February 2019].”
Dr. Bruce G. Blair Written Testimony: Outside Perspectives On U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Policy And Posture
On March 6, Global Zero Co-Founder Bruce Blair testified before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee on the dangers of the U.S. nuclear warfighting strategy and the need to shift to a deterrence-only strategy and a smaller nuclear arsenal.
The End of Nuclear Warfighting: Moving to a Deterrence-Only Posture
“The United States should adopt a deterrence-only policy based on no first use of nuclear weapons, no counterforce against opposing nuclear forces in second use, and no hair-trigger response.”
Nuclear Crisis Group: Urgent Steps to De-Escalate Nuclear Flashpoints
“The Nuclear Crisis Group assesses that the risk of nuclear weapons use, intended or otherwise, is unacceptably high and that all states must take constructive steps to reduce these risks.”
Global Zero: Military Incidents Study
“Around the world, nuclear weapons countries are participating more frequently in military activities that can escalate into dangerous situations with catastrophic consequences.”
Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction: De-Alerting and Stabilizing the World’s Nuclear Force Postures
“The slope from a crisis to nuclear brinksmanship to escalation to the use of nuclear weapons with cascading global implications is a much too steep and slippery one.”
Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission: Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture
“The strategy inherited from the Cold War which remains in place artificially sustains nuclear stockpiles that are much larger than required for deterrence today and that have scant efficacy in dealing with the main contemporary threats to U.S. and global security – nuclear proliferation, terrorism, cyber warfare and a multitude of other threats stemming from the diffusion of power in the world today.”
Global Zero NATO-Russia Commission: Removing U.S. and Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons from European Combat Bases
“…the solution to the current impasse is for the United States and Russia to negotiate the removal of all of their tactical nuclear weapons from operational combat bases in Europe to national storage facilities on their national territories as part of comprehensive bilateral talks on deep reductions in their stockpiles of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.”
World Spending on Nuclear Weapons Surpasses $1 Trillion Per Decade
“…nuclear weapons countries…are passing a new milestone this year by collectively spending approximately one hundred billion dollars on their nuclear programs.”
U.S. Nuclear Launch Decision Process
A timeline of the U.S. nuclear launch order process on warning of an incoming Russian nuclear missile attack.
Global Zero: Estimated U.S. Fatalities from a Russian Nuclear Retaliation
“30% of the total population of the top 145 most populated U.S. cities would perish…from a Russian nuclear retaliatory attack using mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles.”
Global Zero: U.S. Adoption of No-First-Use and its Effects on Nuclear Proliferation by Allies
“In no case has the decision [of U.S. allies] to remain a non-nuclear power or pursue a nuclear capability rested on the expectation of a first use defense from the U.S.”